Explore the site

Looking for a service, risk assessment or training course?
Use the Discovery System on the homepage to find the right option quickly.

Contact MHI

HAZOP Studies in South Africa

Home ● HAZOP Studies

20+

years of experience

HAZOP STUDIES

If you’re running a high-risk process — chemicals, oil & gas, fuel storage, pressurised systems, or anything with toxic/flammable inventories — a HAZOP study is one of the best “early warning systems” you can invest in. Not because it predicts the future, but because it forces a disciplined, structured review of how your process can deviate from design intent… and what happens next.

At MHI Risk Engineers, we facilitate HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies using an experienced, structured workshop approach that helps you identify credible hazards, operability weaknesses, and safeguard gaps before they become incidents, downtime, or expensive redesign.

Whether you call it a HAZOP, a hazop hazard and operability study, or part of broader process hazard analysis, the objective is the same: prove the process is robust, and fix what isn’t.

What a HAZOP study actually is

A HAZOP definition you’ll often hear is:
A structured, systematic method to identify hazards and operability problems by reviewing deviations from a process’s design intent.

The key points:

A good HAZOP isn’t a “box-tick.” It’s a practical engineering review that reduces uncertainty in complex systems.

What we do: Facilitated HAZOP workshops

We facilitate structured HAZOP workshops to identify process deviations and confirm that safeguards are adequate and realistic. The deliverable is clear: a documented, traceable analysis that shows what was reviewed, what was found, and what must change.

When should a HAZOP be done?

A HAZOP study is typically performed:

If you’re unsure whether you need a HAZOP or a different process hazard analysis method, we can help you choose the right study for your risk and project stage.

Our method: How we run a HAZOP study

Our HAZOP Studies typically follow this flow:

01

Divide the process into logical nodes using P&IDs

We break the system into manageable sections (“nodes”) based on your P&IDs and design intent. This keeps the workshop focused and ensures full coverage without getting lost in detail.

02

Apply guidewords to test deviations from design intent

We use guidewords such as:

  • No / Not (No flow, No pressure)

  • More / Less (High pressure, Low flow)

  • As well as (contamination, two-phase flow)

  • Reverse (reverse flow, backflow)

  • Other than (wrong material, wrong composition)

This structured approach is what makes hazop analysis different from informal brainstorming.

03

Identify causes, consequences, and existing protections

For each credible deviation we document:

  • causes (equipment failure, control failure, human error, utility loss)

  • consequences (safety impact, environmental impact, downtime, equipment damage)

  • existing protections (alarms, trips, relief devices, procedures, interlocks)

This is where HAZOP connects directly into hazop risk assessment thinking — even though the HAZOP itself is qualitative, it still evaluates whether safeguards are adequate.

04

Recommend improvements (and make them actionable)

Where gaps exist, we recommend improvements to:

  • process design and equipment

  • procedures and operating discipline

  • instrumentation and alarm/trip logic

  • maintenance/inspection controls

  • training and competency requirements

We keep recommendations practical and traceable, so they can be implemented and closed out properly.

Standards we use

Our HAZOP facilitation is aligned with recognised guidance including:

  • IEC 61882 (HAZOP studies standard)

  • CCPS Hazard Evaluation Guidelines

Get in touch with us

Reach out for any inquiries, support, or to discuss how we can meet your industrial needs.

Contact us

FAQ: HAZOP Studies

What is meant by HAZOP?

HAZOP stands for Hazard and Operability. It is a structured method used to identify hazards and operational problems by reviewing what happens when a process deviates from its intended design conditions.

A simple example is reviewing a line where the design intent is “flow to reactor.”
The team applies the guideword No Flow and asks:

  • what could cause no flow? (pump failure, valve closed, blockage)

  • what happens if no flow occurs? (reactor upset, temperature rise, quality failure)

  • what safeguards exist? (low flow alarm, interlock, operator checks)

what improvements are needed? (add trip, improve procedure, improve instrumentation)

  • HAZOP is process-deviation focused and uses guidewords against design intent (best for complex processes).

  • FMEA is failure-mode focused and reviews how components fail and what effects those failures create (often more equipment/component oriented).

Many organisations use both, depending on scope and project needs.

A HAZOP study is a hazard identification and operability review method (qualitative).
A risk assessment can be qualitative, semi-quantitative, or quantitative (like QRA) and usually includes formal evaluation of likelihood and consequence to determine risk levels and priorities.

In practice, a HAZOP often feeds into risk assessment work by identifying the credible scenarios that must be evaluated.

A practical grouping is:

  • qualitative

  • semi-quantitative (matrices/scoring)

  • quantitative (QRA)

dynamic/continuous (as conditions change)

  • Most commonly:

    • at key design stages (before design is frozen)

    • before start-up

    • after major modifications (MOC)

    • when operating conditions change significantly

    • after serious incidents or near misses

    when recurring trips/alarms or process instability occurs

Different frameworks classify hazards differently, but common hazard categories include:

  • chemical (toxic/corrosive/reactive)

  • flammable/explosive

  • pressure/energy release

  • thermal (hot/cold burns)

  • mechanical (moving equipment)

  • electrical

  • confined space / oxygen deficiency

  • ergonomic/human factors

  • environmental hazards

A HAZOP typically focuses most on the hazards created by process deviations and loss of containment.

A useful general seven-step hazard analysis flow is:

  1. define scope and system boundaries

  2. gather information (P&IDs, procedures, data sheets)

  3. identify hazards and deviations

  4. identify causes and consequences

  5. identify existing safeguards

  6. evaluate whether safeguards are adequate

  7. recommend actions and track close-out

Examples of common safety hazards are:

  • flammable atmospheres

  • toxic exposure

  • high pressure release

  • electrical hazards

  • mechanical hazards (moving parts)

In process environments, major hazard events often originate from loss of containment plus ignition or exposure.

A common FMEA sequence is:

  1. define scope and functions

  2. list components/process steps

  3. identify failure modes

  4. identify effects of failure

  5. identify causes of failure

  6. evaluate risk (severity, occurrence, detection)

  7. define actions and verify improvements

A practical four-stage view is:

  1. hazard identification

  2. likelihood assessment

  3. consequence assessment

risk evaluation and control selection

Different organisations define these differently. A widely useful version is:

  • Recognise hazards

  • Rate risk (likelihood + consequence)

  • Reduce risk with controls

  • Record decisions and actions

  • Review effectiveness over time

Common HAZOP variations include:

  • design HAZOP (during project/design stages)

  • operational HAZOP (existing plants/processes)

  • batch HAZOP (batch processes)

  • procedure HAZOP (focused on operating procedures)

The core method is consistent: nodes, guidewords, deviations, causes, consequences, safeguards, actions.

The key steps are:

  1. define scope and assemble the team

  2. divide the system into nodes using P&IDs

  3. apply guidewords to each node to identify deviations

  4. document causes, consequences, and safeguards

  5. agree recommendations and assign actions

  6. issue the report and support action close-out

A common five-step model is:

  1. identify hazards

  2. decide who/what might be harmed and how

  3. evaluate risk and select controls

  4. record findings and implement actions

  5. review and update

Need a HAZOP study that’s structured, efficient, and actionable?

If you need a HAZOP study facilitated to IEC 61882 and CCPS guidance — with clear documentation, practical recommendations, and a workshop that stays focused — MHI Risk Engineers can help you strengthen safeguards and reduce process risk with confidence.